Token-based replay technique is a conformance checking algorithm that checks how well a process conforms with its model by replaying each trace on the model (in Petri net notation ). Using the four counters produced tokens, consumed tokens, missing tokens, and remaining tokens, it records the situations where a transition is forced to fire and the remaining tokens after the replay ends. Based on the count at each counter, we can compute the fitness value between the trace and the model. == The algorithm == Source: The token-replay technique uses four counters to keep track of a trace during the replaying: p: Produced tokens c: Consumed tokens m: Missing tokens (consumed while not there) r: Remaining tokens (produced but not consumed) Invariants: At any time: p + m ≥ c ≥ m {\displaystyle p+m\geq c\geq m} At the end: r = p + m − c {\displaystyle r=p+m-c} At the beginning, a token is produced for the source place (p = 1) and at the end, a token is consumed from the sink place (c' = c + 1). When the replay ends, the fitness value can be computed as follows: 1 2 ( 1 − m c ) + 1 2 ( 1 − r p ) {\displaystyle {\frac {1}{2}}(1-{\frac {m}{c}})+{\frac {1}{2}}(1-{\frac {r}{p}})} == Example == Suppose there is a process model in Petri net notation as follows: === Example 1: Replay the trace (a, b, c, d) on the model M === Step 1: A token is initiated. There is one produced token ( p = 1 {\displaystyle p=1} ). Step 2: The activity a {\displaystyle \mathbf {a} } consumes 1 token to be fired and produces 2 tokens ( p = 1 + 2 = 3 {\displaystyle p=1+2=3} and c = 1 {\displaystyle c=1} ). Step 3: The activity b {\displaystyle \mathbf {b} } consumes 1 token and produces 1 token ( p = 3 + 1 = 4 {\displaystyle p=3+1=4} and c = 1 + 1 = 2 {\displaystyle c=1+1=2} ). Step 4: The activity c {\displaystyle \mathbf {c} } consumes 1 token and produces 1 token ( p = 4 + 1 = 5 {\displaystyle p=4+1=5} and c = 2 + 1 = 3 {\displaystyle c=2+1=3} ). Step 5: The activity d {\displaystyle \mathbf {d} } consumes 2 tokens and produces 1 token ( p = 5 + 1 = 6 {\displaystyle p=5+1=6} , c = 3 + 2 = 5 {\displaystyle c=3+2=5} ). Step 6: The token at the end place is consumed ( c = 5 + 1 = 6 {\displaystyle c=5+1=6} ). The trace is complete. The fitness of the trace ( a , b , c , d {\displaystyle \mathbf {a,b,c,d} } ) on the model M {\displaystyle \mathbf {M} } is: 1 2 ( 1 − m c ) + 1 2 ( 1 − r p ) = 1 2 ( 1 − 0 6 ) + 1 2 ( 1 − 0 6 ) = 1 {\displaystyle {\frac {1}{2}}(1-{\frac {m}{c}})+{\frac {1}{2}}(1-{\frac {r}{p}})={\frac {1}{2}}(1-{\frac {0}{6}})+{\frac {1}{2}}(1-{\frac {0}{6}})=1} === Example 2: Replay the trace (a, b, d) on the model M === Step 1: A token is initiated. There is one produced token ( p = 1 {\displaystyle p=1} ). Step 2: The activity a {\displaystyle \mathbf {a} } consumes 1 token to be fired and produces 2 tokens ( p = 1 + 2 = 3 {\displaystyle p=1+2=3} and c = 1 {\displaystyle c=1} ). Step 3: The activity b {\displaystyle \mathbf {b} } consumes 1 token and produces 1 token ( p = 3 + 1 = 4 {\displaystyle p=3+1=4} and c = 1 + 1 = 2 {\displaystyle c=1+1=2} ). Step 4: The activity d {\displaystyle \mathbf {d} } needs to be fired but there are not enough tokens. One artificial token was produced and the missing token counter is increased by one ( m = 1 {\displaystyle m=1} ). The artificial token and the token at place [ b , d ] {\displaystyle [\mathbf {b,d} ]} are consumed ( c = 2 + 2 = 4 {\displaystyle c=2+2=4} ) and one token is produced at place end ( p = 4 + 1 = 5 {\displaystyle p=4+1=5} ). Step 5: The token in the end place is consumed ( c = 4 + 1 = 5 {\displaystyle c=4+1=5} ). The trace is complete. There is one remaining token at place [ a , c ] {\displaystyle [\mathbf {a,c} ]} ( r = 1 {\displaystyle r=1} ). The fitness of the trace ( a , b , d {\displaystyle \mathbf {a,b,d} } ) on the model M {\displaystyle \mathbf {M} } is: 1 2 ( 1 − m c ) + 1 2 ( 1 − r p ) = 1 2 ( 1 − 1 5 ) + 1 2 ( 1 − 1 5 ) = 0.8 {\displaystyle {\frac {1}{2}}(1-{\frac {m}{c}})+{\frac {1}{2}}(1-{\frac {r}{p}})={\frac {1}{2}}(1-{\frac {1}{5}})+{\frac {1}{2}}(1-{\frac {1}{5}})=0.8}
Clapper (service)
Clapper is an American short-form video-hosting service headquartered in Dallas, Texas. It was founded in 2020 by Edison Chen as an alternative for TikTok for mature audiences. The app is functionally similar to TikTok and includes tipping and e-commerce features. Following an influx of far-right content in early 2021, Clapper strengthened its moderation practices. It achieved 2 million monthly active users by 2023, and the number of downloads increased after a U.S. bill that would potentially ban TikTok in the country was signed in 2024. == History == With its offices in Dallas, Texas, Clapper was founded in July 2020 by Chinese-American entrepreneur Edison Chen. Chen considered that most online platforms, such as TikTok, were being targeted to young generations, such as Generation Z. He then concepted Clapper as a service with short-form content for mature audiences among Generation X and millennials, while not intending to compete directly with TikTok. Clapper averaged fewer than ten thousand daily active users during 2020, reaching 500 thousand downloads in the next year. Initially without paying for external advertising, the company raised about $3 million during a 2021 seed funding round. In 2023, the app reportedly reached about 300 to 400 thousand daily active users and 2 million monthly active users. The average user was between the ages of 35 and 55. Following the April 2024 signing of the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, which would potentially enact a ban on TikTok in the U.S. in January 2025, Clapper averaged 200 thousand weekly downloads. In 2025, before the day scheduled for the ban (January 19), TikTok users migrated to other apps. As a result, Clapper received 1.4 million new downloads in a week preceding the date. It was listed as the third most-downloaded free app on Apple's App Store on January 14, behind Xiaohongshu and Lemon8, and the term "TikTok refugee" became a trending term. == Features == Clapper presents similarities with TikTok in its layout, including "Following" and "For You" tabs with videos up to three minutes long that can be liked, commented on or shared. A "Clapback" feature allows users to create responses to videos from others. Users can create livestreams and chat rooms in the app. Users can tip Clapper creators through its Clapper Fam monetization feature, in place of in-app advertisements. The Clapper Shop allows for e-commerce between users. The service had distributed $10 million to its users in total by 2023, according to Clapper CEO Chen. == Content == Clapper includes a policy requiring users to be at least 17 years of age, although Clapper CEO Chen described that "there is no adult content" on the platform. Lindsay Dodgson of Business Insider described the content as generally outdated and "reminiscent of 'getting owned' compilations of the earlier internet." The Washington Post's Tatum Hunter characterized Clapper as including sexual or engagement baiting content more prevalently than TikTok. === Moderation === Clapper's team, which had fifteen employees in early 2021, initially stated it would not moderate content as strictly as TikTok and would mostly rely on user reports. Following that year's January 6 United States Capitol attack, far-right conservative videos promoting QAnon and anti-vaccine conspiracy theories appeared on Clapper's "For You" page to a substantial degree for weeks. The videos were made in protest against decisions by platforms, particularly TikTok, to ban such content. Clapper's team stated in January 10 that its rules prohibiting incitements to violence would be strictly enforced. By February, videos and accounts promoting the conspiracy theories had been removed, and QAnon-related content was banned permanently. Clapper's team hired more content auditors and implemented moderation by artificial intelligence for further community guideline violations.
Knapsack cryptosystems
Knapsack cryptosystems are cryptosystems whose security is based on the hardness of solving the knapsack problem. They remain quite unpopular because simple versions of these algorithms have been broken for several decades. However, that type of cryptosystem is a good candidate for post-quantum cryptography. The most famous knapsack cryptosystem is the Merkle-Hellman Public Key Cryptosystem, one of the first public key cryptosystems, published the same year as the RSA cryptosystem. However, this system has been broken by several attacks: one from Shamir, one by Adleman, and the low density attack. However, there exist modern knapsack cryptosystems that are considered secure so far: among them is Nasako-Murakami 2006. Knapsack cryptosystems, when not subject to classical cryptoanalysis, are believed to be difficult even for quantum computers. That is not the case for systems that rely on factoring large integers, like RSA, or computing discrete logarithms, like ECDSA, problems solved in polynomial time with Shor's algorithm.
SIPRNet
The Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) is "a system of interconnected computer networks used by the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of State to transmit classified information (up to and including information classified SECRET) by packet switching over the 'completely secure' environment". It also provides services such as hypertext document access and electronic mail. SIPRNet is a component of the Defense Information Systems Network. Other components handle communications with other security needs, such as the NIPRNet, which is used for nonsecure communications, and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), which is used for Top Secret communications. == Access == According to the U.S. Department of State Web Development Handbook, domain structure and naming conventions are the same as for the open internet, except for the addition of a second-level domain, like, e.g., "sgov" between state and gov: openforum.state.sgov.gov. Files originating from SIPRNet are marked by a header tag "SIPDIS" (SIPrnet DIStribution). A corresponding second-level domain smil.mil exists for DoD users. Access is also available to a "...small pool of trusted allies, including Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand...". This group (including the US) is known as the Five Eyes. SIPRNet was one of the networks accessed by Chelsea Manning, convicted of leaking the video used in WikiLeaks' "Collateral Murder" release as well as the source of the US diplomatic cables published by WikiLeaks in November 2010. == Alternate names == SIPRNet and NIPRNet are referred to colloquially as SIPPERnet and NIPPERnet (or simply sipper and nipper), respectively.
Format-transforming encryption
In cryptography, format-transforming encryption (FTE) refers to encryption where the format of the input plaintext and output ciphertext are configurable. Descriptions of formats can vary, but are typically compact set descriptors, such as a regular expression. Format-transforming encryption is closely related to, and a generalization of, format-preserving encryption. == Applications of FTE == === Restricted fields or formats === Similar to format-preserving encryption, FTE can be used to control the format of ciphertexts. The canonical example is a credit card number, such as 1234567812345670 (16 bytes long, digits only). However, FTE does not enforce that the input format must be the same as the output format. === Censorship circumvention === FTE is used by the Tor Project to circumvent deep packet inspection by pretending to be some other protocols. The implementation is fteproxy; it was written by the authors who came up with the FTE concept.
CatDV
CatDV is a media asset manager program for handling multimedia production workflows developed by Square Box Systems. Quantum Corporation acquired Square Box Systems in 2020. == Versions == The full family of CatDV Products is as follows: CatDV Standalone Products CatDV Professional Edition CatDV Pegasus CatDV Networked Products CatDV Essential - entry level server product CatDV Enterprise Server - for MySQL databases and most common server platforms including Linux, Windows and Mac OS X CatDV Pegasus Server - adds features such as high performance full-text indexing, access control lists, and more CatDV Worker Node - automated workflow and transcoding engine CatDV Web Client - provides access to the CatDV database via a web browser. There is no need to install special software on the desktop, making it easy to deploy to a large number of users. CatDV Professional Edition & Pegasus Clients - designed to support the multi-user capabilities of the CatDV Enterprise and Workgroup Servers from the desktop Using plugins and scripting, which often require additional professional services support to set up, complex integrations with a wide variety of third party systems (including archive, cloud storage, and artificial intelligence) are possible. == Awards == CatDV won two awards in 2010, a blue ribbon from Creative COW Magazine and a "Best of Show Vidy Award" from Videography. In April 2012 Square Box won a Queen's Award for Enterprise for CatDV.
Undeniable signature
An undeniable signature is a digital signature scheme which allows the signer to be selective to whom they allow to verify signatures. The scheme adds explicit signature repudiation, preventing a signer later refusing to verify a signature by omission; a situation that would devalue the signature in the eyes of the verifier. It was invented by David Chaum and Hans van Antwerpen in 1989. == Overview == In this scheme, a signer possessing a private key can publish a signature of a message. However, the signature reveals nothing to a recipient/verifier of the message and signature without taking part in either of two interactive protocols: Confirmation protocol, which confirms that a candidate is a valid signature of the message issued by the signer, identified by the public key. Disavowal protocol, which confirms that a candidate is not a valid signature of the message issued by the signer. The motivation for the scheme is to allow the signer to choose to whom signatures are verified. However, that the signer might claim the signature is invalid at any later point, by refusing to take part in verification, would devalue signatures to verifiers. The disavowal protocol distinguishes these cases removing the signer's plausible deniability. It is important that the confirmation and disavowal exchanges are not transferable. They achieve this by having the property of zero-knowledge; both parties can create transcripts of both confirmation and disavowal that are indistinguishable, to a third-party, of correct exchanges. The designated verifier signature scheme improves upon deniable signatures by allowing, for each signature, the interactive portion of the scheme to be offloaded onto another party, a designated verifier, reducing the burden on the signer. == Zero-knowledge protocol == The following protocol was suggested by David Chaum. A group, G, is chosen in which the discrete logarithm problem is intractable, and all operation in the scheme take place in this group. Commonly, this will be the finite cyclic group of order p contained in Z/nZ, with p being a large prime number; this group is equipped with the group operation of integer multiplication modulo n. An arbitrary primitive element (or generator), g, of G is chosen; computed powers of g then combine obeying fixed axioms. Alice generates a key pair, randomly chooses a private key, x, and then derives and publishes the public key, y = gx. === Message signing === Alice signs the message, m, by computing and publishing the signature, z = mx. === Confirmation (i.e., avowal) protocol === Bob wishes to verify the signature, z, of m by Alice under the key, y. Bob picks two random numbers: a and b, and uses them to blind the message, sending to Alice: c = magb. Alice picks a random number, q, uses it to blind, c, and then signing this using her private key, x, sending to Bob: s1 = cgq ands2 = s1x. Note that s1x = (cgq)x = (magb)xgqx = (mx)a(gx)b+q = zayb+q. Bob reveals a and b. Alice verifies that a and b are the correct blind values, then, if so, reveals q. Revealing these blinds makes the exchange zero knowledge. Bob verifies s1 = cgq, proving q has not been chosen dishonestly, and s2 = zayb+q, proving z is valid signature issued by Alice's key. Note that zayb+q = (mx)a(gx)b+q. Alice can cheat at step 2 by attempting to randomly guess s2. === Disavowal protocol === Alice wishes to convince Bob that z is not a valid signature of m under the key, gx; i.e., z ≠ mx. Alice and Bob have agreed an integer, k, which sets the computational burden on Alice and the likelihood that she should succeed by chance. Bob picks random values, s ∈ {0, 1, ..., k} and a, and sends: v1 = msga and v2 = zsya, where exponentiating by a is used to blind the sent values. Note that v2 = zsya = (mx)s(gx)a = v1x. Alice, using her private key, computes v1x and then the quotient, v1xv2−1 = (msga)x(zsgxa)−1 = msxz−s = (mxz−1)s. Thus, v1xv2−1 = 1, unless z ≠ mx. Alice then tests v1xv2−1 for equality against the values: (mxz−1)i for i ∈ {0, 1, …, k}; which are calculated by repeated multiplication of mxz−1 (rather than exponentiating for each i). If the test succeeds, Alice conjectures the relevant i to be s; otherwise, she conjectures random value. Where z = mx, (mxz−1)i = v1xv2−1 = 1 for all i, s is unrecoverable. Alice commits to i: she picks a random r and sends hash(r, i) to Bob. Bob reveals a. Alice confirms that a is the correct blind (i.e., v1 and v2 can be generated using it), then, if so, reveals r. Revealing these blinds makes the exchange zero knowledge. Bob checks hash(r, i) = hash(r, s), proving Alice knows s, hence z ≠ mx. If Alice attempts to cheat at step 3 by guessing s at random, the probability of succeeding is 1/(k + 1). So, if k = 1023 and the protocol is conducted ten times, her chances are 1 to 2100.